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Promoting Creativity through
Copyright Limitations:
Reflections on the Concept of
Exclusivity in Copyright Law
Christophe Geiger*
ABSTRACT

Do copyright limitations have the ability to promote creativity
and innovation in an effective way? This question may initially sound
astonishing because this incentive function is traditionally attributed
to the exclusive rights and not to their limitations. However, it should
not be forgotten that innovation often builds on existing creations. As a
consequence, by depriving the copyright holder of the right to consent to
certain acts, one might in turn encourage creative uses. In addition,it
is possible for legislatures to draft limitations in order to guarantee
that the permitted uses are not for free by providing for a just monetary
return for right holders, for example by establishing a workable
"limitation-based" remunerationsystem. In many European countries,
uses legitimated by copyright limitations are often coupled with the
payment of remuneration, from which the creators often profit in a
considerable manner. Thus, this Article seeks to reflect on the
limitations and exceptions to copyright from the perspective of the
creators and their interests and, on this occasion, to express some free
thoughts concerning the principleof exclusivity in copyright law.

Associate Professor, General Director and Director of the Research Laboratory of the
Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies (CEIP1), University of Strasbourg; Senior
Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property Law, Munich, Germany.
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Copyright is currently facing a serious crisis of legitimacy,
mostly because of what many scholars consider to be its "overprotectionist" tendencies. 1 Additionally, copyright seems to have
1.
On this "expansionist" tendency of intellectual property, see ROCHELLE COOPER
DREYFUSS ET AL., EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001); William R. Cornish, The
Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights. in 9 GEISTIGEs EIGENTUM IM DIENSTE DER
INNOVATION (Gerhard Schricker et al., eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001); Reto M. Hilty, The

Expansion of Copyright Law and its Social Justification, in 1 COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY IN ASIA (Christopher Heath & Kung-Chung Liu, eds., Hart Publishing
2007); Peter Gyerty~nfy, Expansion des Urheberrechts-Und kein Ende?, 21 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL 557 (2002) (Ger.); Hugh Laddie,
Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated? 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 253 (1996);
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become progressively creator-unfriendly, which is highly problematic,
particularly in those countries that have "creator-centered" copyright
legislation. 2 As a consequence, there is a strong demand by the
general public to redefine copyright law's scope of protection in a more
balanced way. As it is very difficult to take away rights once they
have been granted, scholars have high hopes for the improvement of
the limitations and exceptions to those rights. 3 In recent times, many
calls for an international instrument on limitations and exceptions (or
on their interpretation) can be heard in academic circles and in
Past scholarly discussions were mainly
international forums. 4
the copyright system and how to adapt it to
to
expand
on
how
centered
the challenges of new technologies. Now, however, it seems that the
focus has shifted to the question of how to guarantee an appropriate
balance between protection and free uses 5 -meaning, in short, how

Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual
Property Law, 9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 4 (2004).
This is the case in most of the civil law countries, where the copyright legislation's
2.
emphasis on the person who has created the work is very important. In these "creator-centered"
statutes, the term "authors' rights" is preferred to the term "copyright" in order to establish the
clear link between the creator and the rights he owns. The difference between common law
countries and civil law countries should not be exaggerated and the internationalization of the
subject has narrowed the gap considerably. See Gillian Davies, The Convergence of Copyright
and Authors' Rights-Reality or Chimera?, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 964
(1995).
See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth Okediji, Conceiving an International
3.
Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright, FINAL REP. (University of Amsterdam
Institute for Information Law, Amsterdam, Neth.), Mar. 2008, at 1, available at
Christophe Geiger, Rethinking
http:/lwww.ivir.nllpublicaties/hugenholtzfinalreport2008.pdf;
Copyright Limitations in the Information Society: The Swiss Supreme Court Leads the Way, 39
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 943 (2008); Christophe Geiger, The Future of Copyright
in Europe: Striking a FairBalance between Protection and Access to Information, INTELL. PROP.
Q. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Geiger, The Future of Copyright in Europe]; Annette Kur, Of
Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water-How much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the
Three-Step Test?, RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 08-04 (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,
Munich, Ger.) (forthcoming 2010). For the European perspective, see Copyright in the Knowledge
Economy, GREEN PAPER, (Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Belg.) (2008), at
5, available at http:/ /ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/
greenpaper--en.pdf,(identifying exceptions and limitations as the key to secure the balance of
interest in the Commission of the European Communities copyright legislation).
See e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth Okediji, supra note 3, at 11; Christophe Geiger,
4.
Implementing an International Instrument for Interpreting Copyright Limitations and
Exceptions, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 627 (2009).
See, e.g., Geiger, The Futureof Copyright in Europe, supra note 3; Llewellyn Gibbons
5.
& Xiao Li Wang, Striking the Rights Balance Among Private Incentives and Public Fair Uses in
the United States and China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 488 (2008); Reto M. Hilty &
Christophe Geiger, The Balance of Interest in Copyright Law ONLINEPUBS.,: (Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich, Ger.) 2006, available at
http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/ww/de/pub/forschung/publikationeronline-publikationen.cfm.

VANDERBILTJ. OFENT.AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:3:515

and where something can be taken away from the scope of the right
where too much has previously been given.
Many oppose such a fine-tuning of the copyright system,
especially in the copyright industries.
The adversaries of the
expansion and improvement of the limitations systems primarily
argue that if too much is taken away from right holders, no more
incentive to create or to invest in the creation of the new works will
exist. This lack of incentive would be detrimental for society, as it will
lead to economic and cultural losses, along with the accompanying
consequences, such as unemployment, the loss of cultural influence, or
the need to import innovative products.
The position of these
adversaries is based on the assumption that only exclusive rights can
incentivize innovation. This Article takes the opposite position. It
argues that in a knowledge-based society, a well-designed limitation
system can greatly benefit innovation and creativity, and also readjust
the copyright balance in favor of creators, assuring that they receive
their fair share of profits generated by their works. Part I of this
Article exposes how a limitation-friendly copyright could be conceived.
Part II then verifies that this approach is compliant with imperatives
resulting from constitutional, European, and international law.

I. CONCEIVING A "LIMITATION FRIENDLY" APPROACH FOR COPYRIGHT: A
SAFEGUARD FOR CREATIVITY AND FOR CREATORS

When conceiving a "limitation-friendly" approach, it is crucial
to first understand what the boundaries of copyright are.
International, European, and national legislatures, for example, never
use uniform terminology when they refer to limits imposed on
exclusive rights, which is certainly not a coincidence. In fact, the
terms "limitation" and "exception" are always used together
systematically in international copyright treaties and European
legislation. 6 This difference in vocabulary might profoundly affect the
understanding of such legal instruments, as each term might refer to
different legal realities in different national traditions. 7 A prominent
6.
See, e.g., Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2002 O.J. (L 167) (EC) (Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society); World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20. 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty art. 16, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76; Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1197.
7.
See Martin R. F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An
Analysis of the Three Step Test, in INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (Kiuwer Law
International 2004) [hereinafter Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations]. Professor Senftlben
interestingly points out that the parallel use of both terms in international agreements such as
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example is the problem of the proper interpretation of copyright
boundaries, which in fact can depend on the exact contextual meaning
of a limitation or an exception. Therefore, this Article explains the
legal meaning of "limitations and exceptions" so as to shed light on
their interpretation and on the scope of copyright protection. The
Article also examines whether the principle of exclusivity is always
the appropriate instrument to achieve the objectives that copyright
law pursues. Additionally, the Article discusses whether the principle
of exclusivity can even be reconsidered in certain cases in conformity
with international, European, and constitutional law.
A. Limitations and Exceptions as a Mean to Secure Future Creativity
There are many ways of drafting copyright limitations: (1) as
open-ended provisions, (2) as a catalogue of allowed exempted uses, or
(3) as a combination of both. The first possibility is often found in
common law countries, 8 while the second is typical for civil law
countries.9 The open-ended provision allows judges to react in a more
10
flexible way to new situations, but the results are less predictable.
With a catalogue of allowed exempted uses, however, the legislation is
more rigid, but there is more legal security. The lack of flexibility in
this type of provision tends to be accentuated in civil law countries by
a narrow reading of these limitations, even if this principle of narrow
interpretation is increasingly challenged in doctrine, and courts do not

TRIPS was not an accident, but rather a compromise between the so-called "droit d'auteur" (or
monistic style copyright protection, in which there is especial emphasis on the relation between
the work and its author) and common law copyright traditions. See also StVERINE DUSOLLIER,
DROIT D'AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L'UNIVERS NUMtRIQUE: DROITS ET
546 (Larcier 2005)
EXCEPTIONS A LA LUMItRE DES DISPOSITIFS DE VERROUILLAGE DES OEUVRES

[hereinafter DUSOLLIER, DROIT D'AUTEUR] (discussing the use of both terms as a way to
accommodate different legal cultures in the Copyright Directive of 2001); MICHEL VIVANT &
JEAN-MICHEL

BRUGUIftRE,

DROIT

D'AUTEUR

556 (Dalloz

2009)

[hereinafter

VIVANT

&

BRUGUItRE] (noting it is important to pay increased attention to the vocabulary used in this
context to determine the scope of copyright protection).
See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1909) (amended 1976) (Fair Use
8.
Clause).
For a discussion regarding the difference between civil law and common law
9.
countries in respect of limitations and exceptions, see Pierre Sirinelli, Synthesis of the ALAI
Study Days, in THE BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT: ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS
(Libby Baulch et al. eds., Australian Copyright Council 1998).
For a discussion of fair use in the United States, see David Nimmer, The Public
10.
Domain, Fairestof Them All, and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 280
(2003); see also Christophe Geiger, Flexibilising Copyright-Remedies to the Privatisation of
Information by Copyright Law, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 196 (2008) [hereinafter
Geiger, FlexibilisingCopyright] (proposing a combination of a close catalogue of limitations and
exceptions with an opening clause (based on the "three-step test" provision)),
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always apply these interpretations systematically.1 1 Once a limitation
covers a certain use, the use can be free of charge or lead to the
payment of an equitable remuneration. 12 The limitation is then also
often called "statutory license." However, this situation, frequent in
many European countries (especially in the context of private copy), is
rare or even absent in most common law countries. The fact that an
exempted use is not necessarily a free use is important to keep in
mind and will affect the proposed model of limitation-friendly
approach on copyright. As a result, the approach proposed in this
Article might therefore be considered very European in its spirit, as
most countries in Europe are civil law countries, and might be
surprising (or even rather strange) to a copyright expert from a
common law tradition.
1. What Are Copyright "Limitations and Exceptions," and What Legal
Realities Hide Behind the Terminology?
What are, legally speaking, limitations and exceptions?
Although they are located in the center of all current discussions on
copyright, this crucial question has not been definitively clarified yet.13
Many misunderstandings, which possibly include the principle of the
narrow interpretation of copyright limitations, likely originate in the
different associations of the legal terms "limitations" and "exceptions."
Also, it seems that-as so often in jurisprudence-linguistic terms
eventually stand for creeds. A narrow interpretation can, for example,
only be justified if, in legal terms, a limit is considered to be an
exception to the exclusive copyright, according to the principle exceptio
est strictissimaeinterpretationis.14
11.
See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, L'avenir des exceptions au droit d'auteur, Observations
en vue d'une nicessaire adaptation et harmonisation du systme, 1 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE,
EDITION G NIRALE 186 (2005) (discussing examples in France and Germany); Irrtum: Schranken
des Urheberrechts sind Ausnahmebestimmungen und sind restriktiv auszulegen, in POPULARE
IRRTUMER IM URHEBERRECHT, FESTSCHRIFr FOR R.M. HirwY 79 (Mathis Berger & Sandro
Macciacchini eds., Schulthess Verlag 2008).
12.
See Thomas Hoeren, Die Schranken des Urheberrechts in Deutschland, in
PERSPECTIVES D'HARMONISATION DU DROIT D'AUTEUR EN EUROPE 265 (Christophe Geiger et al.,

eds., Litec 2007).
13.
For an attempt to conceptualize the nature of exceptions and limitations, see Andrew
Christie, Fine Tuning the System: Conceptualising the Nature and Scope of Exceptions to
Intellectual Property Rights, (forthcoming 2010)ATRIP CONF. PAPERS 2008 (Cheltenham, UK/
Northampton, MA) [hereinafter Christie, Fine Tuning the System].
14.
Of course, this principle of narrow interpretation of exceptions is not uncontested.
See, e.g., Markus Wiurdinger, Die Analogiefdhigkeit von Normen, 206 DAs ARCHIV FUR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 946, 965 (2006). In France, nuanced positions are argued in civil law
doctrine. See GtRARD CORNU, 12 DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION, LES PERSONNES, LES BIENS

417,

(Montchrestien 2005) (arguing that limitations must be interpreted in consideration of their
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The term "exception" implies a certain symbolic status, which,
like the term "intellectual property," is often used purposefully. As
explained in previous scholarly work,
the term "exception" implies a hierarchy. If the use is not exactly covered by the
definition of the exception, one must return to the principle of exclusivity. In order to
illustrate this figuratively, one could say that an exception is a kind of an island in a sea
of exclusivity. The term "limitation" implies a different grading. The scope of
exclusivity is determined by its limitations. Beyond these borders, the author is no
longer in control of his work. In order to use the same picture again, the right would
15
In any case,
then have to be considered as an island of exclusivity in a sea of freedom.
if one assumes that the different rights are equally important and that a fair balance
between the various interests is to be achieved, there can be no hierarchy in favor of the
author. On the contrary, copyright law grants exploitation rights only under certain
conditions. Copyright law protects the expression, not the content, and furthermore
only those expressions which exhibit "individuality" or "originality." Therefore, freedom
must be considered as the principle, and exclusivity as the exception that has to be
16
of the
Thus, copyright limitations are no exception to the exclusive right
justified.
17
author, but rather legal techniques that determine the exact scope of copyright.

If one sees limitations as instruments that determine the scope
of a right, and thus specifies the actual legal range of the right by
clarifying the uses that copyright law does not capture, it seems
unnecessary to differentiate between the scope of protection on the one
hand and the limitations to copyright on the other. Copyright then
justification, so that an expansive interpretation shall be possible when it is required to achieve
the objective of the limitation).
See Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of
15.
Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 268 (2004). The analysis is
not different when a limitation provides for the payment of a remuneration. In this case, "sailing
on the ocean of freedom" is still available to everyone, but subject to the payment of a fair
remuneration to the creator, just like the use of highways in some countries is open to all car
drivers but requires the buying of a sticker, or how the use of the underground is open to all
passengers but requires the buying of a ticket. See id.
See Geiger, Les exceptions au droit d'auteur en France (analyse critique et
16.
prospective, in PERSPECTIVES D'HARMONISATION DU DROIT D'AUTEUR EN EUROPE 349 (Litec 2007)
[hereinafter GEIGER, EXCEPTIONS]; Reto M. Hilty, Stindenbock Urheberrecht?, in GEISTIGES
EIGENTUM UND GEMEINFREIHEIT 107 (Tibingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007) [hereinafter Hilty,
Siindenbock]; Thomas Hoeren, Access Right as a Postmodern Symbol of Copyright
Deconstruction?, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI
CONGRESS, (ALAI, New York), June 13-17, 2001; Detlef Krdger, Enge Auslegung von
Schrankenbestimmungen-wielange noch?, M.M.R. 18, 20 (2002).
Christophe Geiger, De la nature juridique des limites au droit d'auteur, 13
17.
PROPRIETES INTELLECTUELLES 882 (2004); Christophe Geiger, Der urheberrechtliche
Interessensausgleich in der Informationsgesellschaft, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER 815 (2004); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Fierce Creatures,Copyright
Exemptions: Towards Extinction?, in RIGHTS, LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS: STRIKING A PROPER
BALANCE 13, Amsterdam, Oct. 30-31, 1997, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Adapting Copyright to the
Information Superhighway, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY COLLOQUIUM 81, 94 Kluwer Law International, 1996). For
a conceptualisation of the nature of exceptions and limitations, see Christie, Fine Thning the
System, supra at 13.
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can be seen with both an active and a passive aspect as a whole and
cannot be separated.' 8 Accordingly, the exploitation rights and the
limitations to those rights are two sides of the same coin. 19
As the Supreme Court of Canada interestingly held in a March
2004 decision, "The fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly
understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a
defence." 20 Although this holding does not correspond to the classic
understanding-at least in Europe 2 -it could be asserted that the
term of protection and its conditions also limit (and/or define) the
exploitation right.
Copyright limitations, like the right to make a citation and a
work in the public domain (such as a work whose protection term has
expired), share the crucial characteristic that the author cannot
prohibit its use if certain conditions are fulfilled. The use is outside of
18.
See also Abraham Drassinower, Exceptions Properly So-Called, in LANGUAGE AND
COPYRIGHT 237 (Ysolde Gendreau & Abraham Drassinower eds., CarswelllBruylant 2009)
(according to whom "scope limitations define the very nature of the right, and therefore the
boundaries constitutive of the copyright holder's entitlement); J. Forns, Le droit de proprigt6
intellectuelle dans ses relations avec lintr~tpublic et la culture, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 25, 28 (Mar.
15, 1951); Jaap H. Spoor, General Aspects of Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright, in THE
BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT: ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, ALAI Study Days 1998,
27 (Sydney, NSW: Australian Copyright Council, 1999). As VIVANT & BRUGUIERE, supra note 7,
at 565: "Dis-moi quelles sont tes exceptions, je te dirais quel est ton droit" ("Tell me what are
your exceptions and I will tell you what your right is" (translated by author)).
19.

See also Haimo Schack, UrheberrechtlicheSchranken, abergesetzlicherNotstand und

verfassungskonforme Auslegung, in PERSPEKT1VEN DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS UND
WETTBEWERBSRECHTS, FESTSCHRIFT FOR GERHARD SCHRICKER ZUM 70, 511 (Beck 2005).
[hereinafter Shack, UrheberrechtlicheSchranken].
20.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, at
48
(Can.).
21.
See, e.g., Kur, supra note 3. Professor Kur advocates for the distinction between
limitations such as the duration of the right, general protection requirements, or subject matter
exclusions, and limitations "which, in spite of a right been granted (and not having expired), pose
an obstacle for the right holder to enforce it in specific situations, or expressed the other way
round, rules that function as defences against claims based on valid, unexpired rights," the
classical example being-according to this author-the quotation right. See id. at 5. For further
discussion, see decision of the Paris Court of appeal, CA Paris, 4t' Division A, 4 April 2007, (2008)
39 IIC 360, according to which the private copy exception can only be invoked as a defense to a
copyright claim and not "in support of an action in the main case, in the light of the principle of
,no action without rights," solution approved by the French Supreme Court (1 t civil division,
19
June 2008, (2008) 217 R.I.D.A. 299). See also French Supreme Court, 1-t civil division, 27
November 2008, (2009) 46 RLDI 10, comment by 0. Pignatari. This classical understanding
might already be challenged in Europe through the implementation in some national laws of
provisions allowing a user to "enforce" a limitation in the presence of a technical measure
blocking a use exempted by law. See, e.g., Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG, Copyright Act], Sept. 6,
1965 BGBI. I at 1273, § 95b, available at http://transpatent.com/gesetzeurhg.html, updated
through Sept. 1, 2009 (F.R.G). In this case, it seems that the limitation does not serve only as a
mere defense, but can also be invoked offensively against the right holder using technical

measures. See Christophe Geiger, Copyright and Free Access to Information, For a FairBalance
of Interests in a Globalised World, 28 EUR.INTELL. PROP. REV. 366, at 370 (2006).
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the creator's assigned control area. Additionally, the justifications for
restrictions such as the copyright term or the conditions of protection
are often similar to those that are raised in connection with
traditional limitations. For example, the principle of freedom of ideas
(or the idea/expression dichotomy, to use a common law terminology)
and the quotation right (or a "fair use" for citation purposes, in a U.S.
context) have the same functions-namely, to allow creators to build
on existing ideas, and to prevent an unnecessary interference while
dealing with existing works, an essential requirement to enable
creative activity. 22 Another argument against such a strict categorical
distinction is that it often can be difficult to distinguish between a
determination of the scope of copyright protection and a corresponding
limitation. 28 This, for instance, became apparent within the meaning
of Article 5 of the directive on the harmonization of copyright in the
information society (hereafter called "Info-Soc Directive" in the context
of temporary reproduction in the internal memory (so-called "RAM"))
of the computer made in the context of browsing and catching on the
Is this a traditional limitation, as the systematic
Internet. 24
Or is this kind of
classification in the Directive indicates?
to use the work
necessary
moreover,
reproduction so insignificant and,
(which shall not be covered by copyright law) that it does not belong to
25
the protected area of reproduction?
The French Supreme Court addressed this problem with regard
to the reproduction of a work as an insignificant accessory ("exception
de reproduction accessoire") in situations when, for example, a work
accidentally reproduces another one in the background. 26 Does this
involve a copyright limitation that a jurisdiction created without
statutory basis? Or is such an economically insignificant use one that
the right of reproduction should not cover because the use is not an act
See CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A L'INFORMATION,
22.
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE 209 (Litec 2004) [hereinafter GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR].

See also VIVANT & BRUGUItRE, supra note 7, at 557 (admitting that the different
23.
situations are not easy to distinguish and that the same situation can lead to different readings).
Commission Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC) (Commision
24.
Directive of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and neighbouring
rights in the information society) (exempts temporary acts of reproduction "whose sole purpose is
to enable: (a) a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a
lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independent
economic significance.").
243 (Litec 1998); VIVANT &
See e.g., ANDRE LuCAS, DROITD'AUTEUR ET NUMERIQUE
25.
594; P.Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is
BRUGUIRE, supra note 7, at
Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 501 (2000).
26.
Cour de cassation [CC] [supreme court], Cass. le civ., Mar. 15, 2005, Bull. civ. I, No.
567 (Fr.); see also Christophe Geiger, Creating Copyright Limitations without Legal Basis: The
"Buren"Decision, A Liberation?,36 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 842 (2005).
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of exploitation of the work? 27 According to the Court, an accessory use
of a work "does not enter into the scope of the monopoly of copyright
protection and should therefore not be submitted to internal rules of
28
this monopoly."
Another example is the private use of a work. Is the private
use of a work a classic copyright limitation, or is the exclusive right
arguably not applicable to the private sphere, as the exclusive right
should apply only to uses of the work in the public sphere? 29
Ultimately, the controversy does not appear to be so decisive if we
keep in mind that in both cases, the author cannot prohibit the use of
his work or parts of his work. But, what seems to be much more
crucial in this context is the function of a copyright restriction. It is
indisputable that copyright law must create free spaces that enable
the creative use of existing works. Through these free spaces, common
constitutional values like the freedom of expression, freedom of
information, and freedom of art shall be secured, and the public
interest in a comprehensive cultural life shall be served. 30 In brief,
limitations are about the promotion of creativity, or, to use an
economic terminology, innovation. 31 Innovation is also one function
that the exploitation rights have to fulfill. 32

27.
See, e.g., VIVANT & BRUGUItRE, supra note 7, at 564.
28.
Cour de cassation (CC] [supreme court], Cass. le civ., Mar. 15, 2005, Bull. civ. I, No.
567 (Fr.).
29.
See, e.g., VIVANT & BRUGUIERE, supra note 7, at
562, 583; Philippe Gaudrat,
Riflexion disperses sur lradication mdthodique du droit d'auteur dans la 'socijt6 de
linformation,RTD COM. 87, 102 (2003).; Philippe Gaudrat & Frederic Sardain, De la copie privge
(et du cercle de famille) ou des limites au droit d'auteur, COMM. COM. ELECTR., Nov. 2005, at 6; see
also PIERRE-YVES GAUTIER, PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE
338(PUF 6th ed. 2007)
("[T]he foundation of the author's right is the public use of the work in an economic perspective");
Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright Vis-et-vis
Patent and Trade-Mark, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 200 (2008) [hereinafter Drassinower,
Authorship as Public Address] ("[C]opyright is less an exclusive right of reproduction than an
exclusive right of public presentation. Copying for personal use, for example, falls outside the
purview of an author's copyright.").
30.
See Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of
Intellectual PropertyLaw?,
35 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 268 (2004).
31.
See also Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations,
Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries, UNCTAD-ICTSD
PROJECT ON IPRs AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, ISSUE PAPER No. 15 (2006) [hereinafter
Okediji, International Copyright System] "The unlimited grant or exercise of rights without
corresponding and appropriate limitations and exceptions has serious adverse long-term
implications not only for development priorities, but indeed for the creative and innovation
process itself." Id.at x (Executive Summary).
32.
See also Annette Kur & Jens Schovsbo, Expropriation of Fair Game for All? The
Gradual Dismantling of the IP Exclusivity Paradigm, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A FAIR
WORLD TRADE SYSTEM-PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING TRIPS (forthcoming 2010). "In spite of their

2010]

EXCLUSIVITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW

2. Supporting Creativity, a rationale of the Copyright System
From a utilitarian perspective, innovation is the superior
objective of the copyright system: "to promote the progress of science
and useful arts," as it is written significantly in the American
Constitution. 33 Here, it again becomes clear that in a functionoriented view of the copyright system, it seems strange to differentiate
between exploitation rights and copyright limitations because both
have the same goal-they are legal instruments for the promotion of
creativity. 34 From this point of view, the debate whether copyright
limitations are granting rights to the user appears as a somewhat
technical discussion which focuses, at least in Europe, on the concept
of subjective rights ("subjective Rechte"/ "droits subjectifs"). 35 In fact,
someone who uses a work in a way that a copyright limitation
legitimates relies not on a limitation-protected interest, but on the
copyright in its negative aspect. He thus relies also on a right, namely
copyright as a whole, which materializes as a result of a balancing
between exclusivity and the need to keep a creation free of a
36
monopoly.
From a function-oriented point of view, there is no hierarchy
between exploitation rights and limitations; what ultimately counts is
the result. 37
This means that copyright limitations cannot be
separated from exploitation rights; both form a whole, which serves

canonisation as a special type of human rights, and irrespective of the strong flavour of personal
rights permeating copyright law, IPR in the first place have been created to 'do a job'-namely to
foster creativity and innovation." Id.
33.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
34.
See also Gerhard Schricker, Urheberrecht zwischen Industrie- und Kulturpolitik,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER 246 (1992), (arguing
that the public interest is a reason for both, the protection and the restriction of copyright).
35.
See Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test, The Future of the Private
Copy Exception in the DigitalEnvironment, 2005 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L 7.
36.
See CCH, 1 S.C.R. 339, at 48 ("The fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly
understood as an integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence ....The fair dealing
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user's right."). Referring to this
decision, see Drassinower, Authorship as Public Defense, supra note 28, at 200 ("Fair dealing in
Canada or fair use in the United States is less an exception to copyright infringement than a
'user's right" unambiguously integral to copyright law." (emphasis added)). See also MarieChristine Janssens, The Issue of Exceptions: Reshaping the Keys to the Gates in the Territory of
Literary, Musical and Artistic Creation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU
COPYRIGHT 347 (Estelle Derclaye, ed.,Edward Elgar 2009) (emphasizing that the balancing
mechanism between exclusive rights and exceptions "is ingrained in the copyright system and is
of paramount importance for its legitimacy and credibility.").
37.
See also Kur & Schovsbo, supra note 31: "Exclusivity should be the dominant
regulatory model only where and to the extent that other, non-exclusive schemes cannot achieve
the same or better results, and/or generate more beneficial effects for society as a whole." Id.
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the promotion of creativity. 38 The range of a right is determined by its
limitations; beyond these limitations, the author has no control over
his work. Thus, the demand for a more extensive and rigorous
protection, 39 as well as the postulate of a narrow interpretation of
copyright limitations, represent a purely political statement. In this
context, what should matter is only whether copyright regulation
achieves the desired purpose, not what legal technique (exclusive right
or limitation) is used.40 If the objectives can be achieved by a greater
curtailment of the scope of protection using extensively interpreted or
additional copyright limitations, then there should be no objection to
it.
Furthermore, even in economic terms, the value of limitations
can be measured in various forms, typically showing the benefits of
such a system. 4 1 There are, in fact, numerous businesses that use
"free" material-meaning material where uses are permitted by a
limitation (so-called "added value services")-to generate income and
economic growth. 42 Even if the limitation provides for the payment of
remuneration, the absence of costs related to finding the right holder
and the negotiation of a license (not to mention, in case of problems,
the costs related to litigation), also has a measurable value, and
therefore facilitates the creative reuses of existing works.

38.
See Okediji, InternationalCopyright System, supra note 22, at XI. "Limitations and
exceptions should correspond with the rights granted to authors." Id.
39.
For a persuasive discussion of this topic, see Alexander Peukert, Ein m6glichst hohes
Schutzniveau des Urheberrechtsf6rdert Kreativitdt und dynamischen Wettbewerb: Ein Irrtum?!,
in, POPULARE IRRTUMER IM URHEBERRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FOR RETO M. HILTY 39 (Mathis Berger
& Sandro Macciacchini, eds.Schulthess, 2008) 39 [hereinafter Peukert, Ein m6glichst].
40.
For a discussion regarding the purpose of copyright protection, see Dusollier, Droit
d'auteur,supra note 5, at 216; Geiger, Droit d'auteur,supra note 14, at 20.
41.
See Llewellyn Gibbons, Valuing Fair Use, Paper Presentation at the Conference on
Innovation and Communication Law, University of Turku, Finland (July 17, 2008).
42.
THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE US ECONOMY: ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Washington DC) (2007); see Llewellyn Gibbons & Xiao Li Wang, Striking the Rights
Balance Among Private Incentives and Public Fair Uses in the United States and China, supra
note 3, at 494 (referring to the findings of the study). Using the research methodology
established in the 2003 WIPO Guide on Surveying the Economic Contribution of the CopyrightBased Industries, the study found "[flair use dependent industries grew at a faster pace than the
overall economy, were more productive, and were responsible for an estimated [$] 194 billion in
exports in 2006." ROGERS & SZAMOSSZEGI, supra, at 44. According to this study, the economic
significance of fair-use based industries would then be substantially larger than that of
copyright-based industries. See id.
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B. Limitations as ProtectionMechanisms of the Interests of Creators
On the other hand, fostering creativity is not the only aim that
copyright law pursues. At least in continental European countries,
the protection of the creator is another essential basis for the system.
For example, it is surely not by accident that the German Copyright
Act is called "Urheberrechtsgesetz," meaning the "Authors' Right
Act." 43 Even if other interests are taken into account and a fair
balance between different interests is sought, 44 the German Act is a
commitment to the fact that a special role within the system shall be
granted to the creator of the work.45 This explains some juridical
particularities of the so-called "Authors' Right" countries, such as the
rights granted to the creator (which is contrary to the "work made for
hire" doctrine), the author's moral rights, or the contractual protection
of the author that copyright contract law provides. Putting the author
in the center of the system does not conflict, as it is often claimed,
with the above-mentioned utilitarian approach. On the contrary, both
approaches complement each other well-to reach an optimal
promotion of creativity, allocation of a special role to the person who
performs the social added value, the creator, 46 makes sense.
Copyright limitations do not mean that works can always be
used free of charge, and legislatures may provide a right to
appropriate remuneration for all uses that copyright limitations
Recital 36 of the "Info-Soc Directive" clarifies this
legitimate.
unambiguously when it prescribed that the member states "may
provide for fair compensation for right holders also when applying the
optional provisions on exceptions or limitations which do not require
such compensation." 4 7 In German law, for instance, remuneration is
provided in most limitation provisions. This remuneration is what is

Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG, Copyright Act], Sept. 6, 1965 BGB1. I at 1273, available
43.
at http://transpatent.comlgesetze/urhg.html, updated through Sept. 1, 2009 (F.R.G).
44.
See RETO M. HILTY & CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, EDS., THE BALANCE OF INTEREST IN
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 3.
45.
For a detailed overview concerning the different interests in German copyright law,
see Reto M. Hilty, Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft: 'Wer will was von wem
woraus?'-Ein Auftakt zum "zweiten Korb", 47 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR URHEBER UND MEDIENRECHT
[ZUM] 983 (2003).
See Christophe Geiger, Intgrt gdndral, droit d'acc~s & linformation et droit de
46.
proprigtd,La proprit6 intellectuelle analysde & la lumi~re des droits fondamentaux, in L'INTERET
GENERAL ET L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION EN PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE 177 (Mireille Buydens &

S6verine Dusollier, eds., Bruylant, 2008).
47.
Commission Directive 2001/29, art. 5 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC) (Commision
Directive of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and neighbouring
rights in the information society)
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often called, mostly in common law countries, quite improperly, 48 a
copyright 'levy."
These remunerations, which are split between
authors and exploiters most of the time in an author-friendly manner,
are-as it has been stressed recently-often much more desirable to
the authors than the royalty payments they receive from contracting
parties. 49 Furthermore, these limitation-based remuneration rights
are sometimes considered inalienable for creators, 50 in contrast to the
exclusive right which is usually transferred to exploiters. Besides the
protection provided through copyright contract law, 51 copyright
limitations can be considered as additional suitable instruments to
achieve a reasonable balance of interests between authors and
exploiters. Given that copyright contract law does not exist in many
nations' bodies of law and that the results in those countries that have
such rules are not yet fully satisfactory,5 2 the limitation-based
remuneration system seems to be an interesting and viable option.
1. Copyright "Levies:" "Remuneration" or "Compensation" for the
Author?
In light of what has been argued previously in this Article, it
can be unclear and inappropriate when a European legislature speaks
of "compensations" in connection with copyright limitations and the
right of creators to receive a fair remuneration for permitted uses. 53
Recital 35 of "Info-Soc Directive", for example, says that "[i]n certain
cases of exceptions or limitations, rightholders should receive fair
compensation to compensate them adequately for the use made of
their protected work or subject matter."54 The French wording is
48.
See Discussion infra Part L.B. 1.
49.
See Adolf Dietz, Continuation of the Levy System for Private Copying also in the
Digital Era in Germany, A&M 348 (2003) (regarding private copying); Reto M. Hilty,
Verbotsrecht vs. Vergiitungsanspruch:Suche nach Konsequenzen der tripolarenInteressenlage im
Urheberrecht, in PERSPEKTIVEN DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS
FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERHARD SCHRICKER ZUM 325 (Beck 2005).

UND

WETTBEWERBSRECHTS,

50.
Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG, Copyright Act], Sept. 6, 1965 BGB1. I at 1273, available
at http://transpatent.comgesetze/urhg.html, updated through Sept. 1, 2009 (F.R.G). The
limitation-based remuneration claims can only be transferred in advance to a collective society.
See also Commission Directive 2006/115/EC, art. 5.2 2006 O.J. L 376/28 (EC) (Commission
Directive of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related
to copyright in the field of intellectual property).
51.
See Adolf Dietz, Les aspects contractuels du droit d'auteur en Allemagne, in GEIGER,
ET AL., PERSPECTIVES D'HARMONISATION, supranote 8,at 465.
52.
See Dietz, supra note 49 (providing examples of court decisions).
53.
See discussion supra I B.
54.
Commission Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC) (Commision
Directive of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and neighbouring
rights in the information society).
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similar: "Dans le cas de certaines exceptions ou limitations, les
titulaires de droits doivent recevoir une compensation 6quitable afin
de les indemniser de mani~re ad6quate pour rutilisation faites de
55
leurs oeuvres ou autres objets prot6ges."
This "compensation" or "indemnity" terminology seems to
imply that some kind of damage has to be redressed. Given the above
discussion, however, these terms appear to be incorrect. One should
speak of "remuneration" instead of "compensation." Hence, there
would be remuneration by way of license and remuneration through a
copyright limitation. It is preferable to use the term "limitation-based
remuneration rights" than the more established and misleading term
of "levies."
The same can be said about the economically-oriented term
"liability rule," often used to describe legal situations where, instead of
a right to forbid, the rights owner only receives monetary reward for
the use of his works, as the notion of liability implies a prejudice that
needs to be compensated. 56 The term "statutory license," which is
often used for limitations coupled with a right to receive fair
remuneration, seems more suitable to express the concept of
remuneration for the use of a copyrighted work.5 7 Surprisingly, the
wording in the German version of recital 35 is clearly more neutral:
"In certain cases of exceptions or restrictions the right holders shall
receive a fair equalization in order to receive an appropriate
remuneration ("Vergiitung") for the use of their protected works or
other subjects of protection."5 8 Likewise, in the "Lending and Rental
Right Directive," the European legislature explicitly stated that
authors and performers enjoy a non-waivable "right to obtain an
equitable remuneration" for the rental of their work that cannot be

55.
Id.
56.
See Kur et al., supra note 31 (defining liability rules as a 'legal structure permitting
third parties to undertake certain actions without prior permission, provided that they
compensate the injured person for the trespass."); see generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972) (reminding that the liability paradigm was primarily developed in the context of tort law).
57.
See id. Although the term "statutory license" is itself not entirely felicitous, as it
implies that there is an exclusive right and that only the permission to use is given by the law.
As already mentioned above, copyright limitations are to be understood as limits to the exclusive
right of the author, beyond which he may not have any control over his work anymore. Therefore
it seems that it would be better to speak of limitations with remunerations (or 'limitation-based
remuneration claims") and limitations without remunerations. See id.
58.
Commission Directive 2001/29, art. 35 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC). The German
version of Recital 35 is: "In bestimmten Fdllen von Ausnahmen oder Beschrankungen sollen
Rechtsinhaber einen gerechten Ausgleich erhalten, damit ihnen die Nutzung ihrer geschitzten
Werke oder sonstiger Schutzgegenstande angemessen vergiitet wird". Id.
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waived. 59 The European Court of Justice, interpreting this concept,
ruled that the right to equitable remuneration had to be viewed "as
enabling a proper balance to be achieved between the interests of
performing artists and producers in obtaining remuneration for the
broadcast of a particular phonogram, and the interests of third parties
in being able to broadcast the phonogram on terms that are
60
reasonable."
The question is whether these different terms represent
different conceptions of copyright limitations and how to handle the
remuneration claims involved. In France, copyright legislation in the
context of private copying refers to the "right to receive a
remuneration for the reproduction of the work" and avoids the
misleading term of "compensation"61 In the end, it is probably not
dispositive
whether
one
starts
from
"compensation" or
"remuneration"-the decisive aspect is likely that in both cases, there
is a possibility for the author to participate in the fruits of his work.
In this regard, only the effectiveness of the participation is important.
What does a very extensive and developed exclusive right mean
to the author if hardly any remuneration flows back to him in the
end?62

If author participation is to be better reached by way of

limitations, then the limitation-based remuneration option should be
preferable to the one resulting from the exclusive right. 63 There are

59.
Commission Directive 2006/115/EC, art. 5.2 2006 O.J. L 376/28 (EC) (Commission
Directive of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related
to copyright in the field of intellectual property)
60.
Case C-245/00, Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten v. Nederlandse
Omroep Stichting, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1251, at § 36.
61.
Code de la propridt6 intellectuelle (Intellectual Property Code) art. L. 311-1 (Fr.).
62.
See Martin Kretschmer & Philip Hardwick, Authors' Earnings From Copyright and

Non-Copyright Sources: A Survey of 25.000 British and German Writers (Center for Intellectual
Property Policy & Management, Bournemouth University),Dec. 2007. The authors conclude,
"that current copyright law has empirically failed to meet the aim of producing the necessary
resources and safeguarding the independence and dignity of artistic creators and performers
(Recital 11, Directive 1001/29/EC). The rewards of best-selling writers are indeed high but as a
profession, writing has remained resolutely unprosperous." Id
63.
See Kur et al., supra note 31 (stating that "in order to establish the system best
suited for the challenge, each regulator must check the pros and cons in view of the specific task
which shall be solved," avoiding any generalizations). The authors rightly underline the
assumption that a liability-based system leads towards "chronic under-compensation" seems
quasi impossible to verify, as "empirical evidence is seldom found, and where it exists, it is often
inconclusive." Id. Therefore, "a robust and reliable liability system rendering fair returns may be
preferable, also under investment aspects, to a weak and insecure regime of property rules." Id.;

see also Kamiel Koelman, The Levitation of Copyright: An Economic View of Digital Home
Copying, Levies and DRM, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2004, 437 (Intersentia, 2005)
(concluding that "both a levy scheme and a system based on, either statutory or technological,
exclusivity may have social costs and benefits. Economic arguments can be made both in favour
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currently many situations in which collecting societies, and not the
authors individually, manage the exclusive right. This especially
applies to the case of mass uses of copyrighted works, where their
individual exploitation would be practically impossible anyway. The
same collecting societies are also in charge of collecting the
remuneration resulting from the limitation-based uses of a work.
Especially in countries like Germany where the collecting societies are
subject to an obligation to contract with the users, 6 4 there is
practically no difference between the collection of remuneration based
on the exclusive right and a limitation-based remuneration claim. In
many cases, the distinction between the exclusion right and its
limitation therefore loses its practical relevance.
2. Case Law Favoring a Limitation-Based Remuneration Approach
In its highly regarded decision on July 11, 2002, the German
Federal Supreme Court saw the potential of "limitation-based
remunerations" as an effective protection of the creator while
extensively interpreting the press review limitation of Article 49 of the
German Copyright Act. 65 The Court decided that electronic press
reviews made by companies for internal use are covered by the press
review limitation on the grounds that a considerable part of the
received payment would flow to the authors themselves and that a
narrow interpretation of the limitation would thus not improve the
66
author's position.
The Swiss Supreme Court recently expanded on the German
Federal Supreme Court's decision. 67 In a very interesting and
innovative decision, the Swiss Supreme Court held that the activity of
a company that commercially prepares and delivers electronic press
reviews (so-called "press clipping and documentation delivery
services" or "value-added information services") is covered by
limitation for personal use according to Article 19 of the Swiss
Copyright Act, which allows the reproduction of a work by third
and against either approach. At this stage, it cannot be determined which approach is the most
desirable from an economic point of view.").
64.
Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz) (German Act for Collective Management of
Authors Rights), Jun. 23, 1995, BGB1. I, § 11 (F.R.G.)
65.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], 11 July 2002, "Elektronische Pressespiegel," [2003] JZ
473, comment by T. Dreier.

66.

Id.

67.
Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] June 26, 2007, 133
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundgerichts [BGE] III 473 (Switz.). See also Christophe
Geiger, Rethinking Copyright Limitations in the Information Society: The Swiss Supreme Court
Leads the Way, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 943 (2008).
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parties. 68 In examining whether this extensive interpretation of the
limitation violates the so-called "three-step test" of the Berne
Convention, 69 the court held:
It can not be assumed that the interest of the right holder is restricted in an
unreasonable manner, if he gets a claim for remuneration instead of the right to
prohibit the use, because both the interest of the journalists and those of the publishers
have to be considered. With reference to the press review, indeed an exclusive right
would perfectly serve the publisher's interests, who normally owns the rights of the
journalists, because then he can freely decide whether he wants to prevent the
reproduction of the works or to give his approval against payment of a corresponding
remuneration. The journalist as the author of the single article, however, has no
interest in such an exclusive right. On the one hand, he is interested in his articles
being available to many readers. On the other hand, he only makes money out of the
reproductions made for the press clipping and documentation services if he is entitled to
70
a remuneration.

Based on this argument, an increased number of limitations, when
coupled with an obligation to pay an appropriate remuneration, can
serve the author's interests by securing a financial reward for his
creative activity. If one really wants to achieve effective copyright
protection, this benefit is not to be disregarded in connection with the
interpretation of the existing limitation system, as well as with its
71
adaptation in the future.
In any case, the copyright limitation protects not only the
remuneration interest of the author who has already created a work,
but also the interests of the author during the creation process. At
this stage, the authors themselves are the major beneficiaries of
limitations to copyright. How could authors deal with existing works
critically if they had no right to quote?
How could university
professors and scientists work without the possibility of copying
articles in order to prepare their own cultural contributions? 2 The
free spaces left by copyright law ensure the free creation of works.
68.
BGer, 133 BGE III 473.
69.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2), Sept. 9,
1886, revised, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. "It shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided
that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." Id.
70.
BGer, 133 BGE III 473.
71.
Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise? Understandingthe
Original Thinking behind Statutory License and Levy Schemes for Private Copying, INTELL.
PROP. Q. 426 (2004); see also Hilty, Siindenbock, supra note 8.
72.
See Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information Society: Reaction
of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers Should Learn, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 103 (2006); see also Geiger, Exceptions, supra note 8, at 349; Reto M.
Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 315 (Paul Torremans, ed., Edward Elgar 2007) [hereinafter
TORREMANS, HANDBOOK].
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However, the existing system still shows weaknesses because it does
not sufficiently account for the fact that in the creation processes that
authors use, elements of existing copyrighted works give rise to new
works. 73 The techniques of sampling in music or appropriation uses in
visual arts are popular examples, among many others.
Thus, introducing a wider limitation for creative uses and
converting the right to prohibit into a right to receive remuneration
should be seriously considered. 74 The exclusive right would thus be
reduced considerably because it would become an exclusive right to
prohibit only the take-over telle quelle of the work. Expressed in
economic terms, the author could therefore only control the primary
market of the work, but not the derivative markets. Such a solution
would require an absolutely new reconsideration of the principle of
exclusivity. The principle of exclusivity is, after all, only a means to
an end. If this end is better reached through an expanded limitation
system, then considerations in the direction suggested here should not
be rejected merely because they do not correspond to the historical
75
tradition in copyright law.

II. IMPLEMENTING THE "LIMITATION-FRIENDLY' APPROACH OF
COPYRIGHT: How MUCH ROOM TO MANEUVER FOR LEGISLATURES AND
JUDGES?
Of course, legislatures and judges can only follow such a
"limitation-friendly" approach if it is compatible with higher-ranking
legal provisions. This raises the crucial question of what room there is
to maneuver, considering the requirements that international,
European, and constitutional law impose. This is a very complex issue
which certainly requires comprehensive explanations. Therefore,
within the limits of this Article, only a few thoughs can be provided,
which surely could be supplemented with a more detailed analysis. In
what follows, this Article will try to demonstrate that the existing

See Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright 2010: The Future of Copyright, EUR. INTELL. PROP.
73.
REV. 43, 46 (2008) ("There is a growing need to sensibly articulate the right to engage in
transformative reuse of copyright material in international and national laws.")
74.

See Christophe Geiger, Copyright and the Freedom to Create, A Fragile Balance, 36

INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 707 (2007); Christophe Geiger, Les limites au droit d'auteur
en faveur de la crdationdiriue,in COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 350 (Aladda 2008).
Kur et al., supra note 31, stating that "the choice between the traditional system
75.
based on exclusivity and an alternative system based on liability rules should be founded on a
comparison of the social benefits and costs involved in both models."
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legal frame is not as narrow as it is often assumed to be, 76 and that
numerous options are available in terms of limitations.
A. ConstitutionalImperatives
Copyright law is very rarely expressly mentioned in
constitutions or similar legal instruments. 77 A prominent exception is
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which provides
that "everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author."7 8
A provision of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of
1966 (the so-called "civil pact") adopted virtually identical language. 79
It is immediately evident that while the protection of the relevant
moral and material interests is affirmed, the way in which this
protection is to be achieved is not. There is no mention in either of
these documents of exclusive rights, or even of property. Thus, it is
compatible with these provisions to guarantee the protection of the
material interests of the author by means of copyright limitations if
they are tied to an appropriate remuneration.
1. Copyright as Property
Such an approach appears problematic in countries in which
copyright is subsumed, in the absence of autonomous constitutional

76.
For a discussion of the flexibilities left by this system, see Christophe Geiger,
"Flexibilising Copyright", supra note 10; P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an
InternationalInstrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright," FINAL REP., Mar. 2008,

available
at
http://www.ivir.nI/publicaties/hugenholtz/fmalreport2008.pdf
[hereinafter
Hugenholtz & Okediji, Conceiving]; Kur, Oceans, supra note 3; see also Peukert, "Ein moglichst,"
supra note 29, at 45 (challenging the rigorous view of intellectual property rights, especially of
the copyright law, from a legal (primarily relating to international, constitutional and
comparative law) and an economical point of view).
77.
But see, e.g., Portuguese Constitution, art. 42(2); Swedish Constitution, art. 2, sec.
19; Slovakian Constitution, Art. 43(1); Slovenian Constitution, Art. 60; Czech Charter on
Fundamental Rights, Art. 34; Russian Constitution, Art. 44(1).
78.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A1810 (Dec. 10, 1948), at art. 27(2).
79.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December
1966, art. 15 (1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.53.
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To
take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
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8 1 This is
protection of copyright,8 0 under the protection of property.
the case in most European countries, and seems to be the case in the
United States too,8 2 although it seems to have been less of an issue in
enjoys protection
U.S. courts to date. At the European level, copyright
83
Rights.
Human
of
Convention
European
the
under
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
2000 even contains the succinct clause, "intellectual property shall be
protected," without explanation of the scope that this protection shall
have.8 4 Due to its atypical wording, the exact scope of this provision is
unclear.8 5 Unfortunately, the preparatory documents do not provide
any clarity in this regard. That this provision is at risk of being in the
center of future debates on intellectual property is a significant
86
problem. For example, the Treaty of Lisbon gives the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union a legally binding force,
and integrates this text in the primary legislation of the European

Some countries in Europe mention copyright at the constitutional level. See, e.g.,
80.
art. 42(2); Swedish Constitution, art. 2, sec. 19; Slovakian Constitution,
Constitution,
Portuguese
Art. 43(1); Slovenian Constitution, Art. 60; Czech Charter on Fundamental Rights, Art. 34;
Russian Constitution, Art. 44(1).
See FRANK FECHNER, GEISTIGES EIGENTUM UND VERFASSUNG (Tiibingen: Mohr
81.

Siebeck 1999); Christophe Geiger, "Constitutionalising"Intellectual Property Law?, The Influence

of FundamentalRights on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP.
L. 381 (2006).
See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605 n.6 (5th Cir.2000). "The
82.
Supreme Court [has] held ... that patents are considered property within the meaning of the
due process clause .... Since patent and copyright are of a similar nature, and patent is a form
of property. . . copyright would seem to be so, too." Id. (emphasis added)."
This has been decided for the European Court on Human Rights for various IP
83.
rights. See, e.g., Balan v. Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (regarding copyright law); Paeffgen
GMBH c/ Allemagne, Eur. Ct. H.R.. (2007) (regarding domain names); Smith Kline and French
Laboratories Ltd. v. The Netherlands, 66 D.R. 70 (1990) (regarding patent rights); Burkhart
L. & PRAC. 197
Goebel, Trade Marks are "Possessions", as Are Applications, 2 J. INTELL. PROP.
2 4 1 7
(discussing
http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/ / / 9
at
available
(2007),
AnheuserBusch Inc. v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)). For a detailed analysis of the intellectual
property case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see Laurence R. Helfer, The New
Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights,49 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1 (2008); see also European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol 1, Sept. 3,
1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (long title: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms).
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), art. 17(2), Sept. 3, 1953, 213
84.
U.N.T.S. 222 (long title: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms).

See Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected!? Article 17 (2)of the
85.
Charterof Fundamental Rights of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision with an Unclear
Scope, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.13 (2009) (criticizing the intellectual property clause in the E.U.
Charter of Fundamental Rights).
See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
86.
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 0. J. (Cl15) 1.
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Union. Hence, there is no doubt that the Court of Justice of the
European Union will justify its future decisions with direct reference
to the provisions of the Charter.
Even before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the European
Court of Justice had already focused directly on the Charter of
Fundamental Rights when testing the validity of community
secondary legislation.8 7 According to the court, even if the Charter is
not yet a legally binding instrument, it still reaffirms the general
principles of community law resulting from the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and the constitutional provisions
common to the member states.88 These principles are, without a
doubt, binding on European legislatures. 89 The European Commission
refers more and more directly to Article 17(2) of the Charter to justify
its actions, notably when strengthening and expanding existing
intellectual property protection. 90
It therefore seems that Article 17(2) of the Charter somewhat
dictates the policy of the European Commission that tends to assure
"a high level of protection" of intellectual property rights
at any cost,
and sets up "a rigorous and effective system" 9 1 of installing a
"maximalist" conception of intellectual property in the European
87.
See, e.g., Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, 2007 E.C.R. 1-03633, at paras.
45-46; Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-05769, at 38.
88.
Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-05769, at 38.
89.
See also Case C-432/05, Unibet, 2007 E.C.R. 1-02271, at 37 (applying the principle
of effective judicial protection).
90.
In fact, one can read in Recital 32 of the EC, Commission Directive 2004/48/EC of
29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectualproperty rights, [2004] O.J. L 157, 30 April 2004,
at 32, that "this Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular, this
Directive seeks to ensure full respect for intellectual property, in accordance with Article 17 (2) of
that Charter." See also Amended proposal for a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand of the
Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectualproperty rights of
26 April 2006, at 12, COM (2006) 168 final (Mar. 26, 2006). For a critical approach of the
semantic umbrella of property, leading to an expansionist conception of IP, see Alexander
Peukert, Intellectual property as an end in itself9?, Paper Presentation at the ATRIP conference,
"Can One Size Fit All?," Munich, 21 July 2008; Raquel Xalabarder, The development of
protection objectives. How far have we moved away from the roots?, Paper Presentation at the
ATRIP conference "Can One Size Fit All?" Munich, 21 July 2008.
91.
See Green Paper of the Commission of the European Communities of 16 July 2008,
Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, COM 466 (2008):
A high level of protection is crucial for intellectual creation . . . .A rigorous and
effective system for the protection of copyright and related rights is necessary to
provide authors and producers with a reward for their creative efforts and to
encourage producers and publishers to invest in creative works.
Id. For a critical comment, see Christophe Geiger et al., What Limitations to Copyright in the
Information Society? A Comment on the European Commissions Green Paper "Copyright in the
Knowledge Economy", 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 412 (2009). Similar phrases can be
found in numerous directives.
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Union. Indeed, it seems that in the opinion of the Commission, a duty
to secure the protection of existing intellectual property rights derives
from this provision, as well as an obligation for the community
legislature to expand protection. One could reasonably wonder about
the origin of the Commission's opinion, which seems to clearly dictate
a certain approach with regard to intellectual property, and thus
leaves little space to maneuver. The opinion is even more surprising
given the wording of Article 17(2) of the Charter in its English,
French, and German versions. It is indeed interesting to notice that
"intellectual property shall be protected" is translated into "la
propri~t6 est prot6g6e" or "Geistiges Eigentum ist geschiizt" (which,
92
correctly translated, would be "intellectual property is protected").
Without a doubt, there is a significant difference between "intellectual
property is protected" and "intellectual property shall be protected."
Only the second could be understood as implying a duty for member
states to strengthen protection.
Despite its erroneous interpretation, the consequences of this
Indeed, the preparatory
provision should not be overestimated.
documents of the Charter clearly seem to exclude an absolutist
concept of intellectual property, as the drafters specified that "the
guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 [of Article 17] shall apply as
appropriate to intellectual property." 93 This means that intellectual
property-just like the right to physical property-can be limited in
order to safeguard the public interest. Article 17(2) could then be
considered to be nothing more than a simple clarification of Article
17(1). Consequently, there would be absolutely no justification to
expand remedies on the ground of Article 17 (2). 9 4 Furthermore, it
should not be forgotten that the Charter of Fundamental Rights
provides for the protection of a series of other fundamental rights of
equal value 95 which have to be taken into account, and against which
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol 1, Sept. 3, 1953, 213
92.
U.N.T.S. 222 (long title: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms) (published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, Dec. 18, 2000
(2000/C 364/01).
Note from the Praesidium, Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
93.
Union, Charte 4473/00, Brussels, Oct. 11, 2000, at 20 (providing helpful explanations relating to
the complete text of the Charter).
See Christophe Geiger, Intellectual "Property"After the Treaty of Lisbon, Towards a
94.
Different Approach in the New EuropeanLegal Order?, (forthcoming 2010).
This clearly results from the general principles of application of the Charter
95.
enunciated by Article 51, especially from the principle of proportionality (Art. 52 (1)). Hence, the
freedom of expression and information (Art. 11), the freedom of the arts and sciences (Art. 13),
the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data (Arts. 7 and 8), the
freedom to choose an occupation and to conduct a business (Arts. 15 and 16), the right to
education (Art. 14) as well as certain other objectives such as social protection (Art. 34), the
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intellectual property rights must be balanced. 96 Furthermore, it is
important to not lose sight of the prohibition of abuse of rights laid
down in Article 54 of the Charter. 97
Moreover, the separate
mentioning of intellectual property in the second paragraph of Article
17 could also be interpreted as the expression of a certain will of the
drafters of the Charter's express intent to point out the specificity of
intellectual property in comparison to the general right to property,
underscoring that it is a property of a special kind, a property with a
strong social function, which should therefore not be equated with
physical property. 98 Under this interpretation, intellectual property
would then have to be considered as having an even more limited
nature than the right to physical property.
2. Consequences of the Constitutional Property Protection
The next important question is whether the treatment of
copyright as property presents an impediment to any expansion of the
limitation system. At this point, only the constitutional side should be
considered because in private law, treatment of intellectual property
as property has always been problematic and is still today discussed
intensively.99
protection of health care (Art. 35), the protection of the environment (Art. 37) and consumer (Art.
38), are all "values" that have to be considered by the Community legislator as well and which
could be opposed to an "expansionist" approach of intellectual property. Note from the
Praesidium, Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Charte 4473/00,
Brussels, Oct. 11, 2000, at 20.
96.
For a discussion of the advantages of a constitutional dimension of intellectual
property see Christophe Geiger, The Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in
TORREMANSINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 52, at 101 [hereinafter Geiger, Constitutional
Dimension]; see generally Laurence R. Helfer, Towards A Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007). For a discussion of the relationship of
intellectual property and human rights, see Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property
Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007); Peter K. Yu,Ten
Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709
(2007).
97.
According to this Article, the abusive utilization of any right guaranteed by the
Charter is forbidden, a principle that could equally be brought forward to thwart an oversized
conception of intellectual property.
98.
See generally Christophe Geiger, Copyright'sFundamentalRights Dimension at EU
Level, in DERCLAYE 35. . As has already been underlined, even the general right to property is
understood in the Charter as a right having strong social bounds. See Christian Calliess, The
Fundamental Right to Property, in EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 448, 456
(Dirk Ehlers, ed., De Gruyter 2007) (stating that the social function "serves as a justification for
and limitation of the restrictions imposed on property utilisation").
99.
See, e.g., CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, GEISTIGES EIGENTUM ALS BEGRIFF UND THEORIE DES
URHEBERRECHTS (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001); Ysolde Gendreau, A la recherche d'une propridtg
perdue, 17 CAHIERS DE PROPRI9TI INTELLECTUELLE 551 (2005); Horst-Peter Gutting, Der Begriff
des
Geistigen
Eigentums,
GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHU'rZ
UND
URHEBERRECHT,

2010]

EXCLUSIVITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW

In any case, it seems that from a constitutional point of view,
there is a kind of a "juridical problem zone" in which different
conclusions are often drawn with reference to the protection of
intellectual property. 100 In particular, advocates of a wide expansion
of exclusive rights have always pointed to natural law and later to the
fundamental right of protection of property to justify their claims. The
natural law question cannot be analyzed in detail here, but it should
be noted that even among the advocates of a natural-law-based view of
property, it was always considered as a right inherently restricted by
public interests. Thus, in a comprehensive analysis of the different
theories on the natural-law-based foundations of property, for
example, Dr. Jakob Cornides, administrator at the European
Commission and Human rights expert, concludes, "The most
important conclusion to be drawn.., is that property is not an end in
itself. Obviously, it must be used in a way that contributes to the
realisation of the higher objectives of human society." 10 1
Similarly, property has always been considered legitimate only
if it serves public interests.1 0 2 Within constitutional law, this thought
was considered again in the principle of the "social bounds" of property
("Sozialbindung des Eigentums").10 3 Especially in Germany, there is
detailed case law concerning the protection of copyrights under Article
14 (protection of property) of the German Constitution.10 4 What must
be emphasized here is that it is incumbent upon the legislature to
define the subject matter of copyright. This means that the state must
first create the associated property rights in order for constitutional

INTERNATIONALER 353 (2006); Ansgar Ohly, Geistiges Eigentum?, in JURISTENZEITUNG 545 (Mohr
Siebeck, Tiibingen 2003) (2003); Laurent Pfister, Is Literary Property (a form of) Property?
Controversies on the Nature of the Authors' rights in the Nineteenth Century, 205 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AUTEUR 117 (2005).

100.
101.

See Bernd Grzeszick, Geistiges Eigentum und Art. 14 GG,51 ZUM 346 (2007).
Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Conflict or Convergence?, 7

J. WORLD INTELL. PROPT. 143 (2004).

102.

The philosophers of the Enlightment, who developed the idea of a legal recognition of

private property, stated it very clearly. See, e.g., JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL

PROJECT FOR CORSICA 1765 (Kessinger Publishing 2004). "It is sufficient to explain my idea,
which is not to destroy private property absolutely, since that is impossible, but to confine it
within the narrowest possible limits ...and keep it ever subordinate to the public good." Id.
On the theory of the social bounds of intellectual property and copyright, see FELIX
103.
LEINEMANN,

DIE SOZIALBINDUNG

DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS

(Nomos, Baden-Baden

1998)

(discussing intellectual property generally); Chrisptophe Geiger, La fonction sociale des droits de
proprigtg intellectuelle, 2010 RECUEIL DALLOZ 510 (discussing copyright) [hereinafter Geiger, La
fonction sociale]; ERIC PAHUD, DIE SOZIALBINDUNG DES URHEBERRECHTS (Stiimpfli, Berne Verlag
2000) (discussing copyright).
See, e.g., German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE, GEWERBLICHER
104.
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER 481 (1972).
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law to protect this property. 10 5 In designing copyright law, the state
has to bring the different interests and the competing fundamental
rights in a proportional balance, with the public welfare serving as a
guideline. Therefore, the legislature has broad powers with which to
act. Professor Bernd Grzeszick recently discussed this point in a
detailed analysis of the relationship between intellectual property and
Article 14 of the German Constitution:
At first, the obligation to grant protected privileges is rather weak. This minimum level
of constitutional protection merely requires that the assets resulting from the activity of
the author or inventor are in principle attributed to them by the simple legal order. He
must have the right to dispose of the result in principle and most notably to be able to
utilize his proprietary position economically. As a result, only a minimum set of rights
is required for the purposes of an institutional guarantee. Beyond this institutional
guarantee, the public welfare shall be the guideline for any admissible legal
development. As far as the law grants protected privileges, the proprietor owns an
individual and exclusive space of proprietary freedom.
However, a sufficient
consideration of third party interests and the general public is also possible. The
individual interest of the author has no unconditional priority over the interests of the
community.
Merely in terms of remuneration, there is a stronger protection of
106
intellectual property, which can be overcome only in exceptional circumstances.

Thus, the German Federal Constitutional Court, in the context
of the protection of intellectual property in the German Constitution,
is focused on guaranteeing that the "assets resulting from the creative
activity are in principle attributed to the author."10 7 The author shall
be able to receive remuneration for the use of his works. By what
means he receives this remuneration is not necessarily prescribed.
Consequently, this participation in the fruits of his labor can be
reached by a limitation-based remuneration right as legitimately as by
an exploitation right.
However, the German Federal Constitutional Court also
considers that the freedom to dispose of the author's work is also a
part of protected essence.10 8 Therefore, property protection probably
prevents a total transformation of the exclusive right into a limitationbased remuneration right.
Nevertheless, the German Federal
Constitutional Court has also recognized the admissibility of
numerous restrictions of the exclusive right in the past when
important public interests are concerned. In the famous "schoolbook"
decision, for instance, the court held,

105.
This is not limited to the German legal situation, but also extends to the protection
of fundamental rights at the European level. See Calliess, supra note 97, at 449.
106.
Grzeszick, supranote 65 at 353.
107.
BVerfGE, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER
481 (1972).

108.

Id.
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With the exclusion of the author's right to prohibit access, the public interest in having
access to the cultural assets is satisfied sufficiently; this exclusion clearly defines the
social obligation of copyright in this decisive area. It does not follow from Article 14
paragraph 2 of the Constitution, however, that in these cases the author would have to
make his intellectual asset available to the general public free of charge. 109

It can thus be concluded that it should be possible to limit the author's
The
exclusive right if important public interests require it.
remuneration, however, may be avoided only in the rarest cases. The
order of priorities is therefore clear-remuneration is the most
important aspect of the constitutional protection of copyright, and the
principle of exclusivity follows behind it.
One could, of course, argue that there is significant public
interest in the creative use of copyrighted material.1 10 Authors
nowadays often build on existing material that is copyright-protected,
and do so all the more when protection levels are relatively low.111 For
innovation-policy reasons, there are very good arguments to put
authors in the best possible conditions for the creation process to
function. For example, authors should be able to create as freely as
possible, without being restricted or handicapped by exclusive rights
that can prohibit the creative re-use of protected material.
This idea is already accepted in Europe in the area of
competition law. In the famous Magill decision by the European
Court of Justice, for example, the use of an exclusive right to prevent
the commercialization of a new product was the target of the
complaint, and a judicial compulsory license was granted as a
result. 12 Such a decision could be "internalized" in copyright law'1 3 by
introducing a copyright limitation for creative uses, which is tied to a
remuneration claim. The exclusive right would therefore continue to
exist, but only to prevent pure copying (except, of course, in cases in
which other limitations are applicable, for example for private copies,
or for scientific or teaching purposes). From the standpoint of a
function-oriented analysis of intellectual property, this would be
unobjectionable.

Id. at 484.
109.
See GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR, supra note 14, at 366-80.
110.
111.
See Gernot Schulze, Litendue de protection du droit d'auteur en Allemagne, in
Christophe Geiger,, PERSPECTIVES D'HARMONISATION, supra note 8, at 117.
Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indep.
112.
Television Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-00743.
113.
See also Thomas Dreier, Regulating Competition by Way of Copyright Limitations
and Exceptions, in TORREMANS HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 232; Annette Kur, Limiting IP
Protection for Competition Policy Reason-A Case study Based on the EU Spare-parts-Design
Discussion, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 313

(Josef Drexl, ed., Edward Elgar 2008).
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B. European Union Treaty Law Imperatives
Other imperatives to account for when redefining the
appropriate scope of copyright protection in the European Union are
the essential principles established in the European Union Treaties,
such as free movement of goods and antitrust law. To accommodate
the national protection of copyright in accordance with the essential
principles of European Union law, the European Court of Justice has
adopted a function-oriented approach to intellectual property. 114 Since
the Magill decision, European antitrust law can control the use of an
exclusive right if it is incompatible with the "essential function" of this
right. 115
Quite characteristically, the European Court of First
Instance specified that the essential function of copyright is to "protect
the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for creative
effort."1 1 6 In this decision, the court identifies clearly the central aims
of copyright law-the protection of the author's moral right and the
author's remuneration. 11 7 The exclusive right is not mentioned. The
German version of this same decision is less clear, as the "essential
function" is defined as to "ensure the protection of the rights in the
intellectual work and the remuneration for creative activity."1 18 What
then is to be understood by "the protection of the rights in the
intellectual work?"11 9 A look at the French version of the same
decision tells us that the focus is clearly on the moral rights and not
on the exploitation rights--"la fonction essentielle du droit est
d'assurer la protection morale de l'oeuvre et la r6mun6ration de l'effort
crateur."1 20 This suggests that limitation-based remuneration rights
can also be achieved through statutory licenses, provided that the
author's moral rights persist. 121 In fact, the self-determination aspect
of property can also be reached by the "droit moral."
114.
See also Christophe Geiger, La fonction sociale, supra note 102, at 514.
115.
Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann, 1995 E.C.R. 1-00743.
116.
Decision of the Court of First Instance (EuG), Case T-76/89, Indep. Television
Pubrns Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-575, at 58.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

121.
Admittedly, this position has not yet been consolidated in the European courts. See,
e.g., Case T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-03193.
The fundamental rationale of copyright is that it affords the creator of inventive and
original works the exclusive right to exploit such works, thereby ensuring that there is
a "reward for the creative effort." Copyright is of fundamental importance both for the
individual owner of the right and for society generally. To reduce it to a purely
economic right to receive royalties dilutes the essence of the right and is, in principle,
likely to cause potentially serious and irreparable harm to the rightholder.
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From a philosophical point of view, property has always shown
a very personality right-based component and that it is even
considered by some scholars as a "personality right." 12 2 Therefore, it
would be justifiable that the author's moral rights, and not necessarily
the author's exploitation rights, would assure control over the use of a
work. The liberal element of property as means of financial selfdetermination, which serves as "a sufficient material basis for a sense
of personal independence and self-esteem, which are both
indispensable for the development of the moral assets,"'123 can possibly
also be ensured by limitation-based remuneration rights, provided
that the amount of the remuneration is satisfactory. In fact, the
substantive element of freedom is to be able to make a living from the
fruits of one's work. Professor Michel Vivant gets to the heart of it
when he writes, "Because man is free, the author and the inventor
must be able to live from the exploitation of their work or
124
invention."
There can be no doubt that, from a liberal perspective, it is
essential that the author participates in the exploitation of his work.
How this participation is organized legally (by way of an exclusive
right or another limitation-based remuneration) is therefore not
decisive. 125 Additionally, the "statutory license" 126 does not necessarily
mean that the author completely loses control of his work. Statutory
licenses can be drafted in a manner that incorporates authors into the
125 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, it is not explained nor demonstrated in this
Id. at
decision why a compulsory license creates a "potential serious and irreparable damage" and how
this should be assessed. See id. It should be noted, however, that it is certainly controversial if
exclusivity is an essential core element of copyright. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 7 11-03601, reviewed in 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 504
(showing that the European courts continue to control the exertion of rights by means of antitrust law and do not hesitate to restrict the exclusive right in certain cases by granting a
compulsory license, demonstrating that the attribute of exclusivity is not considered
untouchable).
See, e.g., Gerhard Luf, Philosophische Str6mungen in der Aufkldrung und ihr
122.
Einfluss auf das Urheberrecht, in WOHER KOMMT DAS URHEBERRECHT UND WOHIN GEHT ES? 9

(Robert Dittrich, ed., Manzsche Verlags- und Universitaitsbuchhandlung 1988). In common law
countries, the closest equivalent to personality rights would be the right to privacy. See HUw
BEVERLEY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY (Cambridge University Press
2005).
123.
JOHN RAwLS, DIE IDEE DES POLITISCHEN LIBERALISMUS, AUFSATZE 1978-1989, 68

(Suhrkamp 1994). For a discussion of the theories of Professor Rawls concerning the property,
see Andrea Esser, Faire Verteilung oder absoluter Schutz des Eigentums? Eine klassische
Alternative in der neueren Diskussion: John Rawls und Robert Nozick, in WAS IST EIGENTUM?
PHILOSOPHISCHE POSITIONEN VON PLATON BIS HABERMAS 127 (Beck 2005).
MICHEL VIVANT, LES CRIEATIONS IMMATtRIELLES ET LE DROIT 11 (Ellipses 1997).
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licensing process, particularly with regard to the amount of
remuneration provided to the authors. A statutory license may
provide that the creator cannot oppose the use of his work, but the
amount of remuneration must be negotiated between the parties. If
no arrangement is reached, it is possible to establish arbitration
bodies that will determine the amount of remuneration and thus
ensure the author participates in the negotiation as required.
C. Imperatives Resulting from International Conventions in the Field
of Intellectual Property
Any domestic legislation implementing such a limitationfriendly approach must comply with obligations that international
conventions have imposed.
In this respect, it should not be
disregarded that in international copyright agreements, the "exclusive
right" is expressly protected.
This is the case in the Berne
Convention, 127 the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 128 and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 129
speak of the "right to authorize or to prohibit" a certain use of the
work. However, all of these agreements also contain limitations and
compulsory licenses, thus restricting this exclusive right. In the same
way, a function-oriented approach can be read into this agreement at
different points.
In this context, the preamble of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty of 1996
is often cited, which recognizes "the need to maintain a balance
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,
particularly education, research and access to information."' 130
Likewise, Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement clarifies,
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge

127.
Berne Convention, for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 11, July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31.
128.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WPT), art. 6,
Dec. 20, 1996, available at http:I www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs-wo033.html.
129.
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 11, Annex IC of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1126 (1994).
130.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WPT), Dec. 20,
1996, availableat http:// www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs-wo033.html.
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and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
131
and obligations.

This obviously concerns an innovation-oriented approach, which, as
noted above, may be achieved better in certain cases by copyright
limitations than by exclusive rights. Article 8 of the same Agreement
provides measures for the member states "to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development" as well as those which are necessary "to
132
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders."
According to these provisions, the rights in intellectual property canand/or must-be developed in such a way that they realize social
interests.
In particular, they must realize the goals of the
agreement-the promotion of innovation in the interest of the general
public133-which a limitation-friendly approach could also ensure.
These measures, however, must be compatible with the TRIPS
Agreement, as Article 8 further specifies.1 34 Regarding the limitations
to copyright, the Agreement contains only one guideline in Article
135
13-limitations may not contravene the so-called "three-step test."
This limitation on limitations can be found with a similar text in
136
many international treaties on copyright and intellectual property.
These provisions require the compliance of the contracting parties and
impose a number of conditions on introducing limitations into their
national copyright law. In order to fulfill the criteria, the limitation
must (1) describe a certain special case, (2) not conflict with the
normal exploitation of the work, and (3) not unreasonably prejudice
131. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 7, Annex 1C of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1126 (1994).
132. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 8, Annex 1C of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1126 (1994).
133.
See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionalityand Balancing within the Objectives
for Intellectual Property Protection, in TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 161 (OUP Oxford
2005); Kur, Oceans, supra note 13.
134. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 8(1), Annex 1C of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1126 (1994) ('Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." (emphasis added)).
135.
See, e.g., SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, supra note 5; Christophe Geiger,
The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society, ECOPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Jan.-Mar. 2007 [hereinafter Geiger, Role of the Three-Step Test]; Annette
Kur, Oceans, supra note 13.
136.
See Christophe Geiger, From Berne to National Law, via the Copyright Directive: The
DangerousMutations of the Three-Step Test, EUR.INTELL. PROP. REV. 486 (2007).
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the legitimate interests of the author 137 and/or the right holder. 138 A
detailed examination of these very ambiguous and unclear guidelines
cannot be done here. Let it suffice to note at this point that the
139
terminology used leaves much for interpretation.
Basically, the three-step test is similar to the requirements of
international and European constitutional law, in whose light it
should be interpreted anyway.1 40 While the first step is the least
demanding one, as it only requires that the uses covered by a
limitation be generally determinable, the third step is the most
important one, as it requires a fair balance of interests involved,
which is reminiscent of the social function of copyright in the context
of the constitutional order and of the related proportionality test. The
second step ensures that the core of copyright is not eroded. In this
spirit, the normal exploitation of the work is interpreted by some
authors as including only the economic core of copyright.1 4 1 The
protected core arguably prohibits transforming the exclusive right
totally into a right to receive a fair remuneration, but the possibility of
a restriction should remain if important conflicting interests of the
general public so require. Thus, for the purpose of a normative
consideration of the three-step test, which some scholars already
advocate,1 42 it is arguable that the "normal" exploitation in some cases

137.
See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31.
138.
See generally Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex
1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1126
(1994). The full text of the TRIPS agreement is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
139.
See Christophe Geiger, Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreements
Provisions on Limitations and Exceptions, in CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL?-PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ATRIP-CONGRESS 2008(forthcoming 2010); Jonathan Griffiths, The Three-step Test In European
Copyright Law: Problems and Solutions, INTELL. PROP. Q. 428 (2009); Hugenholtz & Okediji,
Conceiving,supra note 3, at 25; Kur, Oceans, supranote 13.
140.
See Geiger, Constitutional Dimension, supra note 61, at 101; Geiger, Flexibilising
Copyright, supra note 50.
141.
See Martin R.F. Senftleben, Die Bedeutung der Schranken des Urheberrechts in der
Informationsgesellschaft
und
ihre
Begrenzung
durch
den
Dreistufentest,
in
INTERESSENAUSGLEICH IM URHEBERRECHT 182 (Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert, eds., BadenBaden: Nomos 2004).
142.
For a discussion favoring a normative approach to the second step, see SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS-

THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 13.21 (Oxford University Press, 2006); Geiger,
FlexibilisingCopyright, supra note 50, at 194; Jane Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright
Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the "'Three-Step Test" for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 23 (2001); Martin R.F. Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal
Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights?-WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the
Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT'L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 407 (2006).
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can also be achieved by limitation-based remuneration rights. The
exclusive right would then only cover the right to oppose the sole copy
of the work (primary market) and not its creative use (derivative
markets).143
III. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the legal framework in which a
redrafting of the scope of copyright protection should be embedded,
and has identified what obstacles could exist to such a rebalancing of
the different interests involved. There is much more flexibility than
one might think to implement a limitation-friendly copyright
protection, even if doing so would require rethinking the principle of
exclusivity on which intellectual property is based. The approach
proposed here admittedly seems rather radical, mostly because the
scope of the exclusive right is reduced to the prevention of the mere
copy of the work, and does not cover the creative re-uses. However,
the proposed model would, of course, need some major additional
research in order to become workable. It is by no means the intention
to propose this model as the truth, but instead just to explore what
alternative possibilities exist to promote innovation, and to discern
what room there is to implement such solutions. Of course, depriving
creators of their exclusive right in certain circumstances will not
necessarily benefit all authors equally. In particular, if the author is
very successful, he might prefer to have full control over derivative
works, as he will have a strong bargaining power that will allow him
to get a higher sum for the re-use of his work than in a "limitation
based" system.
The risk of intervening through such a mechanism too strongly
in the market forces is not to be neglected (which might then be
criticized as leading to a "socialization of IP"). In order to preserve as
much decision-making power for right holders as possible, a
limitation-based copyright, in addition to the one already existing,
could be implemented. The two different copyright regimes would
then co-exist, and the creator could then decide if he prefers the

If one does not follow this admittedly quite liberal interpretation of the three-step
143.
test, there is still the possibility of subordinating creative uses to the mandatory collective
administration of works, as this would not be a limitation, but a way of exercise of the exclusive
right, which would therefore not be covered by the three-step test. See Geiger, Role of the ThreeStep Test, supra note 84; Silke von Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive
Rights-A Case Study on Its Compatibility with International and EC Copyright Law, ECOPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Jan.-Mar. 2004.
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traditional regime or the limitation-friendly copyright protection.144
As shown above, since the limitation-friendly solution has major
advantages for creators-for
example regarding the sums
redistributed to them-it might attract many of them, while others
would be free to remain under the classical copyright regime. The
success of "open content"-licenses that many creators use to make
their work available to the public for free-demonstrates that
145
alternative innovation mechanisms are attractive.
The proposed solution combines the advantages of proprietary
and open models for innovation. It would allow creators to freely
elaborate on existing works while ensuring that the creator of the
existing works receives a share of the financial reward: free creative
use, but no re-use for free. For this reason, it deserves attention and
further scholarly work.

144.
Such a dual system has been proposed in the context of peer-to-peer file-sharing. See
A. Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment, 28 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005).
145.
See Catharina Maracke, Creative Commons International:The InternationalLicense
Porting Project, 1 J. Intell. Prop., Info. Tech. & E-Commerce Law (2010) (discussing the open
content movement and more generally the Creative commons licence).

